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The aim of this section is to give brief indications of the character, content and cost of new books in
the various fields of biology. More books are received by The Quarterly than can be reviewed critically.
All submitted books, however, are carefully considered for originality, timeliness, and reader interest,
and we make every effort to find a competent and conscientious reviewer for each book selected for
review.
Of those books that are selected for consideration, some are merely listed, others are given brief notice,
most receive critical reviews, and a few are featured in lead reviews. Listings, without comments, are
mainly to inform the reader that the books have appeared; examples are books whose titles are selfexplanatory, such as dictionaries and taxonomic revisions, or that are reprints of earlier publications,
or are new editions of well-established works. Unsigned brief notices, written by one of the editors,
may be given to such works as anthologies or symposium volumes that are organized in a fashion that
makes it possible to comment meaningfully on them. Regular reviews are more extensive evaluations
and are signed by the reviewers. The longer lead reviews consider books of special significance. Each
volume reviewed becomes the property of the reviewer. Most books not reviewed are donated to libraries
at SUNY Stony Brook or other appropriate recipient.
The price in each case represents the publisher’s suggested list price at the time the book is received
for review, and is for purchase directly from the publisher.
Authors and publishers of biological books should bear in mind that The Quarterly can consider
for notice only those books that are sent to The Editors, The Quarterly Review of Biology, C-2615
Frank Melville, Jr. Memorial Library, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794-3349
USA. We welcome prepublication copies as an aid to early preparation of reviews.

SOCIAL PREFERENCES IN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES

Alexander J. Field
Department of Economics, Santa Clara University
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A review of
Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic
Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies.
Edited by Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel
Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert
Gintis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press. $98.00 (hardcover); $24.95 (paper).
xix Ⳮ 451 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 0-19-9262047 (hc); 0-19-926205-5 (pb). 2004.

This volume reports on a cross-cultural investigation of social preferences in 15 smallscale, non-Western societies. Participants
from all 15 groups played the ultimatum
game with members of their own culture; subjects from a subset also played dictator and
voluntary contribution to public goods
games. The bulk of the book (Chapters 4
through 14) consists of reports by the field
workers (mostly anthropologists). Each chapter includes ethnographic information, a de-
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scription of how members of the group make
their living, details on the experimental protocols and results, and some discussion. Although none of the results are consistent with
the predictions of the standard rational
choice model (as has been true in earlier
work), group average offers and rejection frequencies in these experiments display more
variation than has been observed in experiments using university students from developed Westernized societies. The editors report that little of this variation can be
accounted for by individual economic or
demographic variables, such as gender, age,
education, or wealth. On the other hand,
group dummies account for quite a lot, and
social preferences seem to be stronger in
groups experiencing greater market integration or whose economic mode offers greater
opportunities for gains from cooperative enterprise.
The book is edited by two anthropologists—Joseph Henrich and Robert Boyd—
and four economists: Samuel Bowles, Herbert
Gintis, Colin Camerer, and Ernst Fehr; the
latter two are also well-known experimentalists. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction
to the project and discusses its origins and
funding sources. Chapter 2, coauthored by all
six editors and one of the chapter authors,
provides an overview, synthesis, and interpretation of the results. Chapter 3, by Camerer
and Fehr, reviews the basics of noncooperative game theory, describes the structured interactions (games) that have been used to
measure social preferences, and discusses attempts by theorists to modify standard utility
functions to take account of many of the new
stylized facts.
Since possible differences among the editors are not stressed in the overview chapter,
the remainder of this review focuses on tensions (some implicit) over what emphases to
place on these results and how they are to be
interpreted. At the end of the introductory
chapter, the editors state that “no effort has
been made to produce a unified theoretical
interpretation. There is no party line here,
and some authors suggest interpretations that
are quite different from those of the editors”
(p 7). And at the start of Chapter 2, they acknowledge that “[b]oth theoretically and
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methodologically our results pose more questions than they answer” (p 10). Still, in the
absence of minority or majority reports, one
is led to wonder whether there is, after all,
perhaps a party line among the editors. My
conclusion is that there is not. There are
some fault lines, although one has to read
closely to identify where they lie.
The first, and probably most significant
pinch point is the question of whether or not
we can meaningfully talk about a universal
human psychology and, if so, whether these
types of experiments can tell us something
about it. Some of the authors are sympathetic
to this possibility. For example, Kim Hill and
Michael Gurven speak of the possibility of an
“evolved tendency to cooperate that is unique
to our species” (p 382). But other authors
may not be so sympathetic, and one suspects
there are differences among the editors as
well. As a rule, anthropologists are prone to
be skeptical: their stock in trade, after all, has
been the documentation of behavioral diversity among human groups.
Traditional economic theory, on the other
hand, can be interpreted as sympathetic to
the idea: it has tended to assume that most
individuals have a similar set of underlying
preferences. The rational choice approach
need not be, but often it is paired with the
assumption that these preferences are selfish
in the sense that in most arenas we act so efficiently as to advance our material self-interest. This leads to what one can call the canonical selfish actor rational choice approach,
the validity and plausibility of which has often
been reinforced by a narrow interpretation of
what economists believe Darwinian selection
could have allowed.
In the last couple decades, a growing body
of experimental research has gone beyond investigations of the cognitive underpinnings of
the model to challenge its motivational (selfish actor) component. These include studies
of behavior in prisoner’s dilemmas, voluntary
provision of public goods experiments, ultimatum and dictator and trust games, as well
as games involving opportunities for third
party punishment. Collectively, these results
have suggested a set of species typical predispositions at variance with those traditionally
assumed by economists. These include pro-
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pensities to cooperate when theory says we
should not, and to punish others when theory
says we should not.
Economists typically make an exception to
the assumption of universal selfishness when
modeling behavior within the family. The
range of allowance for altruistic behavior
within the field has roughly coincided with
that explicable within biology as the consequence of Hamiltonian kin selection. But the
experimental results involve behavior among
anonymous subjects who are not close relatives and, thus, present challenges to the
model that range far beyond the phenomena
of parents sacrificing for children. The experimental interactions are, moreover, typically one shot, in principle precluding appeal
to repetition or concern with reputation in
explaining why people behave the way they
do.
Work in this volume extends this experimental research beyond the typical subject
pool of university students in developed
countries. The editors take pains to emphasize that it remains the case that none of the
results are consistent with the predictions of
the rational choice approach. They list this
point first in their summary of results (p 10)
and repeat it several times thereafter.
But the runner-up emphasis is on the variability of results among groups. The message
here is that culture matters; the implication
is that scholars may make big mistakes if they
generalize from experimental data on Western university students in forming predictions of behavior in other social groupings.
There is an important tension between
these two emphases. The main statistical conclusion emerging from consideration of the
experimental results as a whole is the low explanatory power of individual-level economic
or demographic variables as opposed to
group dummies in explaining variation in individual behavior. After appropriately ruling
out differences in group genetic averages as
the explanation for this finding, the editors,
and most of the authors of the field reports,
interpret these differences as cultural, reflecting group-level differences in learned beliefs
and norms.
Before considering the implications of this
interpretation, let us go back for a moment
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to the original body of experimental work on
social preferences. There continues to be a
real struggle to gain acceptance for this research, one that involves educating skeptics
about the aims and successes of experimental
methods. The power of the approach is that
it offers a means of controlling for the embeddedness of most observational data in repeated interactions where issues of reputation matter. In spite of this, it is common to
hear behavior in ultimatum games, or one
shot PD experiments, dismissed on the
grounds that subjects do not fully grasp that
they are in a one shot situation. As a result, it
is claimed, they import into the experimental
context heuristics and behavioral rules that
have served them well in nonexperimental
contexts. Stated alternately, the criticism is
that the intended controls for repetition and
embeddedness do not really work.
This style of dismissal remains common in
spite of the fact that experiments by Fehr and
Fischbacher (see page 79 of the volume under review for description) have clearly refuted the hypothesis that subjects cannot or
will not recognize when they are in a one shot
situation and adjust their behavior accordingly. If the hypothesis is left standing, however, one is led to conclude that this type of
experimental research tells us little about innate species typical behavioral predispositions. A corollary is that the corpus of work
no longer poses a challenge to the canonical
model, whose motivational assumptions can
continue to be “confirmed” by armchair intuition and a limited reading of Darwin.
Return now to the emphasis on group differences in this volume. To say that variation
in behavior is a cultural phenomenon is to say
that members of different groups bring to experimental situations different heuristics or
rules of behavior that have served them well
in nonexperimental circumstances within
their society. For example, to make hyperfair
offers because one lives in a society of aggressive gift giving where the object is not altruistically to transfer wealth but selfishly to put
others in your debt, or to reject all offers because of concerns that it may create obligations to others, must mean that you, as an experimental subject, do not fully understand
that you are in a one shot anonymous inter-
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action, or understand but are unwilling or unable to alter your behavior, or are “mindlessly” applying heuristics from life outside
the experiment.
Note that the explanations offered for the
group differences are very similar to the arguments used by skeptics to dismiss the original body of experimental work. The evidence
is pretty clear that the skeptics are mistaken
in their critique as it applies to university student subjects. But perhaps the claim is right
for these new studies. What would that mean?
It would mean that the experimental methods had been unsuccessful in one way or another in controlling for reputation and repeated interaction. Some of the larger group
variance would reflect noise that might be reduced with retests and refinements of experimental protocols.
These experiments are in some respects curious instruments with which to document
cultural differences, since if we accept that
there are no significant genetic differences
among (as opposed to within) human groups,
then persisting group differences in behavior
in these games reflect partial failure of our
methods. If one wants to study cultural differences, why use tools that were originally intended, at least in part, to abstract from
them?
The interpretation of the variance in group
averages as cultural poses something of a
problem for behavioral economists. If the
variation is a purely cultural phenomenon,
what is to stop us from concluding that the
average level of behavior across all subject
populations—what one might take as an estimate of species typical predispositions—is
also an entirely cultural phenomenon? But if
that is so, then the power of the large body of
experimental literature referenced above to
challenge the selfish actor part of the standard economic model largely disappears. We
are back to arguing that we are innately selfish in all arenas save those in which kin selection operates, and it is only a thin veneer of
culture and civilization that keeps us away
from each other’s throats.
One is led to ask, therefore, whether this
research provides marginal enhancements to
an existing body of experimental research, or
a significant challenge to it. If one emphasizes
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the primary conclusion, that none of the results are consistent with the predictions of the
canonical model, one gravitates toward the
first conclusion. But if one focuses on the second emphasis, that of differences in group
averages explicable as the consequence of
cultural variation, one may be inclined toward the second.
Since economists have generally been skeptical both about the potential influence of
culture on behavior (and, more generally, its
utility as an explanatory variable) and about
the possibility that humans might have some
biologically altruistic predispositions beyond
those expressed within the family, either conclusion leaves a challenge on the table for the
canonical approach. But the nature of the
challenge in the two cases differs. In the first
instance, it requires acknowledging the role
of culture in resolving the problem of social
order, and in sometimes fashioning different
solutions to it. In the second, it requires relaxing somewhat the selfish actor assumption,
and allowing for a set of innate prosocial predispositions upon which culture builds. In the
first case, prosociality inheres entirely in information acquired after birth stored in
brains. In the latter, it inheres in part in a set
of species typical genetically mediated behavioral and cognitive predispositions. The cognitive component may involve differential
preparedness to learn in certain directions, as
is the case in the acquisition of language,
helping to account for some of the universal
features of human culture.
The possibility that we have these inclinations is, of course, related to the continuing
debates about the role of higher-level
(group) selection in molding human psychology. Most readers of the QRB are familiar
with the history of this contentious issue: the
widespread acceptance of the empirical importance of group selection through the first
half of the 1960s, the attack by George Williams (1966) on Wynne-Edward’s work
(1962), the emerging consensus over the next
two decades that group selection, if not theoretically impossible, required demographic
conditions so unlikely as to render the possibility that it had any significant behavioral or
morphological legacy close to nil and, finally,
the efforts by David Sloan Wilson and others
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to reintroduce the topic into respectable conversation (Wilson and Sober 1994). Wilson’s
development of models more resistant to the
standard critiques than were those of Sewall
Wright (1945) has made considerable headway in the last decade, causing dismissals of
the topic to be more circumspect. But it is an
understatement to say that group selection is
still controversial: it remains the third rail of
biological discourse.
What does this have to do with this research? One reason many economists and
others have remained skeptical of the experimental results is that they believe that natural
selection would have precluded any favoring
of dispositions that might, upon initial appearance at low frequency, have been biologically altruistic within particular groups (see
Field 2001 for discussion). Wilson’s success in
providing more robust models of how such
traits could have survived, and thus suggesting a more elaborate range of mechanisms
through which natural selection might have
operated, forces practitioners of the canonical approach to reconsider this buttress for
their skepticism about the experiments.
Wilson’s progress is now, however, being
subtly undermined by the propagation of
what one might call the currently fashionable
position. Adherents to this set of views (see,
e.g., Richerson and Boyd 2004) argue that although biological group selection is theoretically possible, it has left no measurable behavioral or cognitive legacy on humans. They
go on to say that, in contrast, cultural group
selection has been a powerful force molding
human behavior, benefiting from conformity
norms and transmission through means
other than from parent to child.
Cultural group selection, although it may
use mechanisms (selection, mutation, drift)
analogous to those used in models of biological selection, is not biological group selection, which results in changes in gene frequencies. Cultural group selection cannot
have influenced the spread of prosocial genetic predisposers unless coevolutionary
forces were sufficiently powerful to allow such
change. Gene culture coevolution can plausibly account for the evolution of lactose tolerance in pastoral societies and the spread of
genes in tropical areas that in the homozy-
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gous form cause sickle cell anemia, but in the
heterozygous form provide protection against
malaria. But neither of these oft-cited examples involves genetic predisposers to prosocial
behavior, and Richerson and Boyd (2004
:244) come close to denying that it was possible for coevolutionary forces to favor such
inclinations.
Aside from these difficulties, there is the
question of what happened prior to 500,000
years ago. We have had the capabilities of developing and transmitting culture in ways that
differentiate us from other animals only for
perhaps a half a million years. Cultural group
selection cannot have been a force before
then.
By continuing to emphasize (cultural)
group selection, the Boyd and Richerson position seems to acknowledge the inroads that
Wilson has made in reintroducing group selection to the behavioral sciences. But, in reality, it drastically reduces the legacy of biological group selection, and thus has the
potential to return the debate to where we
were after the publication of Williams (1966).
This in spite of the fact that Williams has
backtracked considerably from his earlier positions, and now acknowledges a potentially
significant role for biological group selection
(see Williams 1992; Field 2006).
Among the editors of this volume, Boyd has
been the most active in promulgating this set
of views, but Fehr and Henrich here and in
other works sign on to essentially the same
position (Henrich was Boyd’s student). Gintis
and Bowles have been more ecumenical in
allowing for the possibility of a legacy of biological selection, and Camerer’s position on
this issue is less clear.
Although there may not be a party line
about the possible behavioral legacy of biological group selection, adherents to the currently fashionable position form at least a majority among the editors. This issue is critical
in understanding the tension between the
two main themes in the editors’ interpretation of the results. Let us grant that the group
differences are cultural. If we combine this
with the position that there has been no empirically significant legacy of biological group
selection, then we are inexorably led to the
conclusion that the species typical tendencies
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reflected in the average behavior of all experimental subjects is also a purely cultural
phenomenon. We are thus almost back to
thin veneer explanations of human sociality,
and a denial that prosocial predispositions
might have a genetic/biological substrate.
This position requires us to accept that our
ancestors a half million years ago had no prosocial predispositions (since culture could
not have been operative before then). This
would have included the absence of any restraints on intraspecific harm, which most
mammals exhibit. A half million years ago we
were, according to this story, a savage set of
beasts inclined not at but before the slightest
provocation to tear each other to shreds. It
was the fortuitous invention of culture that
saved the day, particularly after we discovered
how to make weapons from tools (see Lorenz
1966).
I do not find this position defensible, a conclusion I suspect is shared by the economist
editors of this volume—Gintis and Bowles, if
not Fehr and Cameron. Explicit discussion of
the problem is, however, studiously avoided
throughout the volume. The closest Henrich
comes to acknowledging some noncultural
substrate is to ask rhetorically whether there
might not be “innate social grammars . . . for
acquiring contextually specific cues about
fairness, cooperation, and punishment” (pp
164–165). But there is no serious treatment
of the mechanisms of natural selection that
could have allowed such grammars to be favored.
These studies, and their interpretation,
leave unresolved the question raised near the
start of this review. Do we accept that there is
a universal human psychology, a set of species
typical behavioral and cognitive predispositions that are genetically and biologically mediated, upon which cultural norms build in
ways that have some commonalities, but can
also generate systematic differences in the average behavior of members of different
groups? Or do we throw out the notion of
universal human psychology, returning to a
blank slate view in which the entire enterprise
is driven by culture? This tension is reflected
in the introduction where the editors describe their priors before Henrich ran the initial experiments on the Machiguenga: “Since
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all of the previous experiments had been
done using students from urban, literate,
market-based societies, there was no way of
knowing whether the social preferences at
work were a part of human nature, or a consequence of the particular cultures from
which subjects were drawn. It seemed likely
to most of us that the social preferences were
universal, but until somebody did real crosscultural experiments, we wouldn’t know for
sure” (p 3).
So, do we now know for sure? And do we
know for sure that social preferences are not
part of human nature? The logic of attributing differences in group averages to cultural
differences will lead some to the conclusion
that the population averages are also a cultural phenomenon, and thus that the original
experiments on university students do not reveal basics of a universal human psychology,
and do not pose a challenge to the motivational assumptions of the standard economic
model. I infer that the economist editors, who
come from the behavioral side of economics,
were (on balance) unwilling to sign on to this
position. Thus, the primary conclusion is
that, like the original research, none of these
experimental results are consistent with the
predictions of the standard economic model.
But if we put this emphasis front and center, then the experimental results reported
here begin to look more and more like second order footnotes to the original work, perhaps reflecting difficulties in administering
experimental protocols in the field. I infer
that the anthropologist editors and most of
the chapter authors were not enchanted with
this interpretation.
What can be done to move the discussion
forward? I do not think that doubling the
number of small-scale societies studied would
add much. Thus, I strongly agree with the
opinion voiced by Hill and Gurven: “At this
point, we think more investigations into the
effects of changed experimental conditions
will teach us more about cross-cultural variability than we can learn by simply increasing
the sample size of different cultures tested”
(p 409).
For example, the argument that ultimatum
game behavior reflects an inability to distinguish between and modify behavior in the
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light of the fact that one is in a one shot,
anonymous interaction, is remarkably resilient. One sees it popping up in John Patton’s
discussion of the Conambo (p 98), or Jean
Ensminger’s suggestion that “we might find
behavior in one shot games consistent with
behavior more appropriate to repeated
games” (p 358). As noted, this claim has been
tested and rejected for university student subject pools. But perhaps, for one reason or another, it is applicable under these field conditions. One way to resolve the issue would be
to replicate the Fehr and Fischbacher (2003)
experiments using these nonuniversity student subjects. If it turns out that subjects are
not adequately differentiating between one
shot and repeated interactions, this will be a
tip-off that they do not fully understand the
games in which they are involved or that
there are other defects in the protocols that
need to be remedied.
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At the end of the day, one needs to step
back and ask which is the greater threat to
progress in developing an empirically-based
behavioral science consistent with our understanding of evolutionary theory. Is it that theorists will mistakenly interpret the results of
experimental work done on Westernized subjects as having more universal applicability
than is justified? Or that the selfish actor rational choice paradigm will persist, unmodified by the wide range of experimental work
inconsistent with its predictions that preceded the work reported in this volume? I am
more concerned with the latter possibility. In
the long run, I think we will conclude that
this research offers some enhancements to
the original body of experimental research,
but should not derail the continued effort to
flesh out the components of a species typical
human psychology, to which the original effort has made such important contributions.
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